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THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE PATENT
STATUTE: A TRILOGY OF CASES AND
THEIR EFFECT TODAY
By WILLIAM J. KEATING*

To paraphrase Will Rogers, everyone talks about invention
but no one seems to know what it is. The Supreme Court, in a

trilogy of cases' involving patent validity, informed the Fifth2 and

Eighth3 Circuit courts that they had applied the wrong standard of
patentability, announced the tests to be used, and concluded that
to qualify for a patent the inventive act must be "non-obvious" in
light of the prior art.4 Although synonyms are useful in letter
writing and other forms of rhetoric, they are seldom useful in
statutory interpretation. One could merely read the statute and
come to the Court's conclusion.5
This article will analyze the Court's decisions in the three
cases and discuss the development of the various tests for patentability based upon obviousness. The state of the law in the courts
of appeals, the Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals before and after the trilogy will be examined to
determine whether these courts are adhering to the standard
set down by the Supreme Court and section 103 of the Patent Act.
*

B.S., 1947, Canisius College; J.D., 1954, Georgetown University;

Patent Counsel for AMP Incorporated, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Lecturer
on Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Dickinson School of Law. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Gary R. Myers for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Calmar, Inc. v. Cook
Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
2. The Graham patent was litigated in the Fifth Circuit prior to its
litigation in the Eighth Circuit and went to the Supreme Court from the
Eighth Circuit.
3. John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964).
4. Nonobviousness is only one condition for patentability and is
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). Utility and novelty are also requirements
for patentability and are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 102
respectively. These two sections were not in issue in the trilogy of cases.
5. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

Winter 1968]

THE PATENT STATUTE
THE FIRST AND SECOND CASES

The first case, Graham v. John Deere Co.," was factually quite
simple. Graham, the inventor, recognized that mounting the
shank of a plow on the upper surface of the hinge plate prevented
vibration of the shank when the plow hit a rock or other obstruction. Consequently, the shank tended to become bent or broken in
usage. Graham repositioned the shank on the lower side of the
hinge plate where it could vibrate, thereby increasing the useful
life of the plow. The issue in the Patent Office was whether repositioning a plow shank on the opposite side of the hinge entitled
Graham to a patent. The Patent Office decided that it did and
awarded Graham Patent No. 2,627,798 (hereinafter '798). The inventor assigned the patent to the Graham-Holm Plow Company
(Graham) which threatened the Jeoffroy Manufacturing Company
with a suit for patent infringement. Jeoffroy took the initiative
and sought a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalidT
Graham counterclaimed for patent infringement.
To put the litigation in its proper perspective, a previous suit
between Graham and Jeoffroy must be mentioned which involved
the validity of an earlier Graham patent, No. 2,493,811 (hereinafter
'811), on a vibrating plow. The district court held the '811 patent
valid and infringed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, enjoining Jeoffroy against
further infringement, and the Supreme Court refused
8
certiorari.

After the first declaratory judgment action, Jeoffroy changed
the construction of the plow and brought the instant action. Graham, however, contended in his counterclaim that the altered construction still infringed the '811 patent and charged infringement
of the later '798 patent as well. Graham also applied for a contempt order against Jeoffroy based on the injunction granted in
the prior suit.
The district court held that Jeoffroy's altered plows violated
the claims of the '8l patent, but said that the '798 patent was invalid because it did not constitute a patentable advance over the
'811 patent. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the '811
patent was not infringed but the '798 patent was both valid and
infringed.9 The Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 10 Although Jeoffroy had infringed the patent, Graham never made or
sold a plow of the type covered by the '798 patent.
6. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
7. The district court opinion is not reported, but see Jeoffroy Mfg.
v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511, 512 n.2 (5th Cir. 1955), for a summary of the
opinion.
8. Jeoffroy Mfg. v. Graham, 206 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 920 (1954).
9. Jeoffroy Mfg. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 826 (1955).
10. Id.
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The Graham '798 patent was litigated again in the Fifth Circuit against Cockshutt Farm Equipment, Inc.1" The district court
held the patent valid but not infringed and the court of appeals
affirmed. About the same time as the Cockshutt suit, Jeoffroy
marketed still another version of their plow which they contended
did not infringe the '798 patent. Graham disagreed and applied for
a contempt order. The district court found that Jeoffroy's new
plow still infringed the claims of the '798 patent and the court of
appeals again affirmed. 12 All these cases were tried by the same
district judge, a circumstance which moved the court of appeals to
take judicial notice that "the able trial judge has become an expert
in the art of spring plow clamps of the Graham type."13 For this
reason, they held that his findings were entitled to even greater
weight than usual findings.
A court of appeals decision that a patent is valid carries
considerable weight, but is not binding on litigation in another
circuit. Graham filed suit in 1962 against the John Deere Company in the Western District of Missouri for infringement of the
'798 patent. 14 The district court, relying heavily on the previous
litigation in the Fifth Circuit, held the patent valid and infringed. 15
The Eighth Circuit reversed the holding of validity and dismissed
the question of infringement as moot."" The court of appeals
noted the contrary decisions of the Fifth Circuit, but said that it
felt constrained to apply a higher standard of patentability when
the patent involved a combination of elements, when each of the
elements was individually well known, and the patentee was
relying on a new mode of assembly rather than a new combination of elements. The court held that this situation requires a
strict standard of patentability because of the improbability that
a combination of known elements could produce anything more
than what would be expected from the ordinary skill of an artist
in the field. The test, it said, was whether the combination produced something more than the sum of the parts. The case was
ripe for review by the Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted.
The second case, 1" considered concurrently with Graham by the
Supreme Court, was actually two cases consolidated for trial.
Declaratory judgment actions were filed against the Cook Chemical
Company by Calmar, Inc. and the Colgate-Palmolive Company.
Each alleged that Cook's patent on a spray pump was invalid and
11.
1958).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Graham v. Cockshutt Farm Equip., Inc., 256 F.2d 358 (5th Cir.
Jeoffroy Mfg. v. Graham, 256 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1958).
256 F.2d at 359.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 216 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
Id.
John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964).
Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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not infringed by the devices they marketed. The suits were filed
in the Western District of Missouri.18 Defendant Cook admitted
jurisdiction, counterclaimed in both suits for patent infringement,
and charged Colgate with unfair competition. The two cases were
consolidated on the issues of patent validity and infringement,
and the question of unfair competition was deferred pending
determination of the patent issues.
The evidence showed that Cook had marketed a liquid insecticide. The bottle contained a hand pump situated in the cap that
operated as a sprayer to apply the liquid. Originally, Cook bought
a pump from Calmar and attached it to the side of the bottle. The
purchaser had to insert the pump into the bottle prior to usage.
A problem arose because the pumps became detached or broken
during transit, so it was deemed desirable to place the pump directly into the bottle of insecticide when it left the factory. Cook
set up a subsidiary and began to manufacture its own spray
pumps. Although others, including Calmar, had attempted to design a sprayer which could be shipped in the bottle, they were uniformly unsuccessful. Apparently the high viscosity of the fluid
caused leakage problems when a "hold-down" cap was placed over
the sprayer pump to hold it in a retracted position during shipment.
A Cook employee designed a successful device by making a fairly
minor change in the construction of the hold-down cap. By spacing the bottom of the cap from the top of closure of the container,
threading of the cap could continue until the inner gasket was completely compressed, thereby forming a satisfactory seal. The employee also added a rib between the container and the cap to ensure sealing. The Cook device met with instantaneous commercial success. Calmar and Colgate then adopted a device which
the district court found to be virtually identical to the structure
covered by the Cook patent.
The district court held that the patent was valid and had
been infringed by Calmar and Colgate. In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied heavily on the deficiencies of prior devices, the
need for a device of this type, the inability of others working in
the art to solve the problem, the technical success of the patented
device in solving the problem, and the commercial success of the
device when it reached the market.'9
The case went to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.20

Although

the Eighth

Circuit is notoriously

strict in determining patent validity,21 the three judge court agreed
18. Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 220 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Mo.
1963).
19. Id. at 419, 421.
20. Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 336 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1964).
21. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th CONG., 2d SESS.,
AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION STATUSTICS (Comm. Print 1961), where
the disparity in the circuits is noted.
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that the patent was valid and had been infringed by Calmar and
Colgate. None of the judges that decided Graham participated in
the Cook decision.
The court of appeals acknowledged the strict standard of
invention required for a combination of old elements to rise to the
level of a patentable invention. Because the court felt that the device fulfilled a long-felt need in the industry, however, with an
economical, efficient, utilitiarian apparatus that achieved novel22reit
sults and was the subject of immediate commercial success,
held that the invention covered by the patent in suit met even
the stringent standard of the Eighth Circuit.
There was nowhere for Calmar and Colgate to go but up.
Although the case lacked the usual attributes which attract the
Supreme Court's attention, certiorari was granted. 23 The only
plausible explanation for granting certiorari was that the Supreme
Court was anxious to reverse.
THE

GRAHAM AND COOK DECISIONS

The American patent system, a holdover from English jurisprudence, has existed in some form since 1790. Authority to grant
24
patents was provided in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
The purpose of the system, as recited in the Constitution, is to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. The founding fathers left to Congress the task of structuring the system to
achieve this objective.
Mr. Justice Clark prefaced the decision in Graham and Cook
with an exhaustive treatise of the origin and history of United
States patent laws and gave special attention to the writings
of Thomas Jefferson, the author and first administrator of our
patent system. He found that Jefferson had an instinctive aversion
to all monopolies, including patents. Apparently Jefferson was
reluctantly converted to the view that limited monopolies in the
form of patents might be granted to encourage ingenuity. A patent board, of which Jefferson was a member, was created to determine whether an invention was sufficiently useful and important
to merit a patent. The board formulated rules governing the circumstances under which a patent might be awarded or denied.
These rules evolved slowly on a case-by-case basis rather than
being promulgated as a statutory set of requirements. According
to Justice Clark, "Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for
small details, obvious improvements or frivolous devices," but insisted on a "high level of patentability." 25 The volume of work
became onerous, so the task of setting standards was transferred
22.
23.
24.
25.

336 F.2d at 113.
Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
383 U.S. at 9.
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to the judiciary to develop additional conditions for patentability,
again on a case-by-case basis.
The next historical incident Justice Clark considered noteworthy was the Supreme Court's decision in the landmark patent
case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.2 Hotchkiss involved the validity
of a patent on doorknobs. The inventor substituted clay for metal
or wood and received a patent on a clay doorknob. The Supreme
Court held the patent invalid because it was nothing more than an
obvious substitution of material in the manufacture of a known device. Although a clay doorknob was new and useful, it did not
rise to the dignity of a patentable invention because it was the
product of nothing more than the usual skill possessed by an
27
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.
Hotchkiss added a new dimension to the characteristics required to justify a patent. Jefferson's philosophy was that a
patent was only justified when the benefit to the public, in the
form of increased human knowledge, outweighed the detriment to
the public resulting from a legal monopoly. With Hotchkiss, for
the first time, the courts had a standard against which to measure
the invention and thereby determine whether it was entitled to a
patent. If the teaching of the invention was equal to or less than
the expertise expected from a mechanic with ordinary skill in the
art, a patent was not justified. If its teaching reflected expertise
in excess of that expected from a mechanic with ordinary skill in
the art, a patent was justified.
After reviewing Jefferson and Hotchkiss, Justice Clark focused
on section 10328 of the Patent Act:
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject
matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention
is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the man29
ner in which the invention was made.
The Senate and House reports 30 suggest that the section is a
26. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
27. "[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . .. than
were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention." Id. at 267.
28. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
29. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
30. See generally SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS,

EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH

A STATUTORY STANDARD

OF INVENTION,
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codification of the case law generated by Hotchkiss. When section
103 was enacted, in spite of its clear language and the congressional reports that it merely codified existing law, many text
writers, attorneys and judges speculated as to what it really
meant. Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit exploded a legal bombshell when he rendered the opinion in Lyon v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co. 31 He concluded that in the 100 years between
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood3 2 and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Co.a3 the standard of patentability had
been progressively raised, but that section 103 reinstated the
Hotchkiss standard. The higher standard to which Judge Hand
referred resulted from A & P and Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,3 4 which held that a patentable invention had
to be an advancement over the prior art as well as nonobvious in

light of the prior art. This standard was applied by the Eighth
Circuit in Graham and Calmar to a combination patent that
employed old elements, the test being whether the combination
produced something more than the sum of its parts.3 5 In Reiner
v. I. Leon Co.,3 6 subsequent to Lyon, Judge Hand said that the

standard had become so high that the only valid patent was one
the Supreme Court could not get its hands on. In Reiner Judge
Hand restated that section 103 had repudiated the higher standard
and restored the original rule of Hotchkiss.
Other circuits reached conflicting interpretations,3 7 causing a
wide disparity in the percentage of patents being held valid-from
8% in the Eighth Circuit to 82% in the Tenth Circuit.38 For 14
years after A & P the Supreme Court repeatedly refused certiorari
on the question of patentability. The clamor became so loud that
non-legal publications carried articles criticizing the Court for
its failure to give direction in an important area of law.3 9
When Graham and Cook finally reached the Supreme Court,
the conflict in standards of patentability was dismissed in a few
terse sentences. The Court said that the level of patentability
since Hotchkiss had not become stricter and that section 103 merely
STUDY No. 7, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1958); Hearings on H.R.
3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
31. 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
32. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
33. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
34. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).

35. See p. 246 supra.
36. 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960).
37. See Borkland v. Pederson, 244 'F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1957); R.M.
Palmer v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956); Vincent v. Suni-Citrus
Prod., 215 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove
Co., 203 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1953).
38. See note 21 supra.
39. See The Patent Mess, FORTUNE (Sept. 1962), where one section is
entitled "The Supreme Court Loses Interest."
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codified existing law. What had changed was the level of tech40
nology; instead of the standard being raised, the base was raised.
The Court then addressed itself to application of the standard
to a fact situation. The Court related section 103 to the Constitution, saying that a patent was valid only if it "promoted the
progress of science and useful arts." Under section 103, the constitutional purpose was fulfilled if the knowledge contributed by
the invention would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains.4 1 Thus, the
relevant inquiries are:
(1) What does the prior art teach?
(2) What are the differences between the prior art and
the alleged invention?
(3) What is the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art?
(4) Are the differences between the prior art and the
alleged invention greater than the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art ?42
The first questions only prepare the way for question four, which
is the ultimate determinant of patent validity or invalidity. These
questions are easier to state than to apply to a given fact situation.
In the usual patent litigation, the patentee's attorney makes an
impassioned plea that the invention would not have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art; the infringer's attorney
pleads with equal fervor that it would. The result normally
turns more on advocacy than objectivity. Justice Clark, however,
dismissed the problem as one43 that courts are daily called upon to
solve in all areas of litigation.
The Court discussed what it called "secondary considerations," later called subtests, which may have relevancy as indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness. These secondary considerations include: (1) commercial success; (2) long-felt, but unsolved needs; (3)

failure of others; (4) etc. 44

Consideration two

argues that if consumers had long needed the product and t.was
not available, the product was an unobvious invention. The first
consideration, "commercial success," is a corollary of the second;
that is, if the product achieved immediate commercial success,
there must have been a long-felt need. The third consideration is
harder to dispute. The rationale is that if others working in the
art applied themselves to the same problem and failed to solve it,
the patentee's solution must have been unobvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.
40. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966).

41. Id. at 17.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 18.
44. Id. at 17, 18. See also Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A
Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964).
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Justice Clark did not say what the "etc." encompassed, but it
apparently refers to other considerations surrounding the invention or marketing of the product rather than a comparison between
the invention and the prior art. Infringement or copying may be
evidence of invention, since the copier chose to copy the invention
rather than the prior art. Competitors in the industry taking
licenses under the patent may be res gestae evidence that the industry respects the patent. If the invented product is more expensive than the prior art, commercial success is given great
weight since the demand for the product stems from its technical
superiority.
Prior to Graham the circuits were split on the question
whether these subtests were secondary or primary indicia of nonobviousness. 45 This disaccord coupled with the disparity on the
patentability standard compounded the disarray. Relegating the
subtests to a secondary status may not substantially assist in the
attainment of one standard of patentability throughout the circuits. The main problem in determining "nonobviousness" without the aid of the secondary considerations is the inability to overcome the factor of hindsight. Once advised of the solution to a
problem, it is difficult to understand why the problem ever existed. Although the difference between the invention and the
prior art may be quantitatively small, that small difference which
eluded the art for years may have been responsible for the invention's success. By focusing on the secondary considerations,
however, a court is comparing the state of the industry and marketplace before and after the invention to gauge its impact. This
comparison is more objective and relies upon what the industry
thought of the invention rather than what judges and lawyers
think of the patent.
Justice Clark, however, dismissed these tests as secondary considerations that may have relevancy. 46 He noted that the Patent
Office has the primary responsibility of sifting out unpatentable
material and observed a "notorious difference" between the standard applied by the Patent Office and by the courts. About
100,000 patent applications are filed each year and 50,000 mature
into patents, with a resulting backlog of 200,000 patent applications
on file in the Patent Office. 47 The inference is that if the Patent
Office were more selective and strictly applied the appropriate
45. See Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960); Wahl Clip-

per Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1933), in which the
courts raised the subtests to primacy; see Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v.

Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); General Elec. Co. v. Jewel
Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242 (1945); Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton

Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949), in which the subtests were given secondary consideration.
46. 383 U.S. at 18.
47. Id.

Winter 1968]

THE PATENT STATUTE

tests of patentability, fewer invalid patents would issue and applicants would be discouraged from filing so many applications. Denial of a patent on a filed application is subject to review, however,
by either the District Court for the District of Columbia 8 or the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.4 9 For all practical purposes, these appellate bodies set the standard of patentability that
the Patent Office is currently following. The Patent Office is
whipsawed between the Scylla of too high a standard, resulting
in reversal by either of the above courts, and the Charybdis of
too low a standard followed by a declaration of invalidity under
the Supreme Court test.50
The Court next applied the law to the Graham facts. The
question was whether placing the shank of a plow under the
hinge plate instead of on top of it would have been obvious to one
skilled in the art at the time the invention was made. It was this
change that increased the useful life of the plow. The Court held
that it was not a patentable invention under the primary considerations. In a paragraph entitled "Obviousness of the Differences," 51 the Court said that the desired result was evident and
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately see
the advisability of inverting the shank and hinge plate. Although
Justice Clark may be right, it is difficult to see how the decision is
anything more than a conclusion of fact, which settles the question
of the Graham patent's validity but is of little value in predicting
the validity of an unlitigated patent.
The treatment of the Cook case was equally perfunctory. The
Court reversed the court of appeals, which had affirmed the lower
court, and thus held the patent invalid. In so doing, the Court
violated its own "two-court rule" that the Supreme Court will not
review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. There
is serious doubt, however, whether the two-court rule applies to a
finding of patentability in a patent case.5 2
The Court detailed the structure of the sprayer and background of the patent, including the industry's need and the high
degree of commercial success. It will be remembered that the
Eighth Circuit, applying the "exacting standard required for a
combination of old elements to rise to the level of patentable in48. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1952).
49. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
50. See, e.g., Helene Curtis v. Sales Affiliates, 233 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1956), where the District Court for the District of Columbia forced the
Patent Office to issue a patent and later another district court found that
the same patent was invalid.
51. 383 U.S. at 24.
52. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147 (1950); Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944); Note, The 1966 Patent
Cases: Creation of a Constitutiona!Standard, 54 GEo. L.J. 1320, 1350 (1966).
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vention,"5 3 held the patent valid based on the objective "secondary" tests previously discussed. The Supreme Court, however,
again focused its attention on comparison of the patent with
the prior art. It saw as the distinctions (1) an additional sealing
rib on the inside of the closure, and (2) spacing the lower edge of
the hold-down cap away from the container. The Court found that
the use of an extra rib seal was disclosed in the prior art in a
patent not cited by the Patent Office Examiner during prosecution of the patent application. It also concluded that the spacing
arrangement between the cap and the container was an obvious
expedient and quoted language in the district court's opinion to
that effect.
The Court dismissed consideration of "long-felt need, commercial success, etc." as not being germane to this case, referring to
them as "legal inferences or subtests" 54 that relate to motivational
rather than legal issues. Although admitting their relevance in a
proper case, Justice Clark held that the subtests did not tip the
scales of patentability in the case at bar because they rested upon
exceedingly small and nontechnical mechanical differences in a device old in the art. The final denunciation of the long-felt need
test was that apparently no one thought to seek the answer in the
information stored in the Patent Office files. Justice Clark felt
that an inspection of the 3,200,000 United States patents and an
equal number of foreign patents would have yielded an obvious
answer to the problem. 55
THE TmD CASE

The third case, United States v. Adams, 561 was considered concurrently by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Claims. The patent involved a storage battery that could be shipped without any fluid in its cells, stored
indefinitely, and activated within thirty minutes merely by adding plain water. The hero of the piece, inventor Adams, was reminiscent of the adventures of Don Quixote, jousting with the bureaucratic windmills of the United States Government. The only
difference is that Adams bested the government windmills.
Bert Adams, a tinkerer who operated out of his home on
Long Island, is one of a vanishing breed of "garret inventors."
For years he worked on a battery that could use plain water for
fluid and his experimentation produced such a battery with a
magnesium anode and a cuprous chloride cathode. During one of
his experiments, he accidentally dropped cigarette ashes into the
cathode material and the battery performed even better. In all
subsequent batteries, Adams included ashes in the cathode.
53. Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 336 F.2d 110, 113 (8th Cir. 1964).
54.

383 U.S. at 36.

55. See id.
56. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
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Adams' batteries had several advantages over conventional
batteries: (1) they could be stored indefinitely and then activated
by adding water; (2) they delivered constant voltage regardless of
the rate of discharge; (3) they were quite efficient at low temperatures; (4) the efficiency of the batteries remained constant over
the life of the battery; and (5) their capacity for generating current was exceptionally large for their size and weight. The major
disadvantage was that once turned on, they could not be turned
off until the battery was exhausted.
Adams filed his patent application in 1941 and the patent
issued in 1943. 51 After filing his application he toured the government agencies, especially the Army and Navy, and was discouraged at every turn. The agencies conducted numerous tests
and concluded that the battery was not workable. The National
Bureau of Standards recommended that the project be dropped.
In 1943 the Signal Corps decided that the battery was feasible,
solicited bids from battery companies and entered into procurement contracts. The Government did not compensate Adams, but
surreptitiously infringed the patent. A Signal Corps Development
Conference on battery research noted that the Adams battery was
responsible for technical developments that otherwise would have
been impossible. Adams discovered the government's perfidiousness in 1955 and demanded administrative compensation, which
was finally denied in 1960. Suit was entered in the Court of
Claims. 58 The complaint alleged patent infringement and alternatively breach of implied contract. The Trial Commissioner, in
view of the overwhelming equities favoring Adams, found the
patent valid and infringed. An exceptionally strong case of nonobviousness was presented, since experts in the art still doubted
that the Adams battery would work and the theory of the battery
is unknown even today. The Court of Claims affirmed the Trial
Commissioner per curiam 5 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari at the government's request.

THE ADAMS Dcisiof
The Supreme Court reviewed four patents and two treatises
relied upon by the government to invalidate the patent, and found
the prior art wanting. The deficiencies were noted as follows:
(1) French treatise
Merely suggested use of water; was of
"little interest" until ammonium chloride
(1880)
was used; did not suggest magnesium and
cuprous chloride electrodes.
(2) Hayes patent
Similar to No. 1.
Suggested a magnesium electrode, but did
(3) Wood patent
57. United States Patent No. 2,332,210.
58.
59.

Suit was brought under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964).
Adams v. United States, 330 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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not teach cuprous chloride electrode or
water as an electrolyte.
(4) Codd treatise
Merely listed magnesium as one of a number of materials that could be used as an
electrode.
(5) Wensky patent
Suggested cuprous chloride as a depolarizing agent.
(6) Skrivanoff patent Taught magnesium as a first electrode and
a second electrode of copper covered with
a paste comprised of cuprous chloride
mixed with other chemicals. The electrolyte was sulfuric acid.60
Of the six references, the Skrivanoff patent came closest to anticipating the invention disclosed in the Adams patent. Adams' expert
testified, without contradiction, that when he followed the teaching
of Skrivanoff the device caught fire and exploded. Having disposed of Skrivanoff, the weaker defenses also crumbled.
The Court then considered whether Adams had merely substituted equivalent materials; that is, magnesium for zinc and
cuprous chloride for silver chloride. The Court reasoned that
equivalency of materials would result in equivalent operating characteristics. Since the Adams battery had valuable advantages over
other batteries and these advantages were wholly unexpected, it
concluded that there was no equivalency of materials.
In summary, the Court found that:
(1) the Adams battery was novel;
(2) it did not merely substitute equivalent materials;
(3) it was unobvious;
(4) its operating characteristics were unexpected;
(5) the prior art would have discouraged a person skilled in
the art from attempting what the patentee invented;
(6) experts expressed disbelief in the invention;
(7) the Patent Office cited no reference against the application."'
Accordingly, the finding of validity by the Court of Claims was
affirmed.
Query to what extent the overwhelming equities in Adams'
favor influenced the decision. The action began with a drama
between a small impoverished inventor who struggled for years
to perfect his product only to have a villain steal the invention
and use it while advising him that it was worthless. After secretly
awarding contracts to battery manufacturers for the Adams battery, the government took inconsistent positions: the invention
would not work but it was already old and well known in the art.
60,
61.

United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 45-48 (1966).
Id. at 51, 52.
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The Supreme Court undoubtedly sensed that this case cried out for
interposition of the Court between the citizen and his government.
THE LAW IN THE CIRCUITS BEFORE AND AFTER THE TRILOGY

Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in each case is easier
than reconciling them in an attempt to establish positive guidelines
for courts to follow in future cases. One major difficulty is
that Adams involved the discipline of chemistry while the other
cases involved mechanical devices. The non-chemist is hesitant to
pass judgment on what would be obvious to a chemist of ordinary
skill. In Adams, therefore, Justice Clark relied heavily on objective evidence surrounding the invention process and the government's attitude toward the invention.
A layman does not, however, require a scientific education to
understand things mechanical. Most persons are at least occasionally called upon to make simple repairs. If a device does not have
too many moving parts, a man can probably figure out how it
works without an engineering background. Justice Clark explained
at length how the plow in the Graham patent operated and concluded that anyone understanding the problem would immediately
see that the solution was to invert the shank and hinge plate. In
Cook, addition of the extra rib was similarly obvious. The idea of
spacing the cap away from the container was so apparent that
he could not understand why the Patent Examiner allowed the
patent.
Hindsight is more readily applied in disciplines with which
one is familiar. Since Justice Clark understood the mechanical relationship of parts in the Cook and Graham patents, he possibly believed that if the problems were freshly presented he would have
been capable of solving them in the same way as the patentees.
In the discipline of chemistry, he was less equipped to apply hindsight to the extent he was less familiar with the subject. Of
course, the important inquiry is what effect these decisions will
have on future judicial interpretations. An analysis of the decisions to date will partially answer that question.
Circuits Recognizing Graham and the Section 103
Test of Nonobviousness
Second Circuit
Section 103, the standard in the Second Circuit even prior to
62
Graham, was established in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
63
and supplemented by Reiner v. I. Leon Co.
These cases repre62.

224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).

63.

285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960).

upon in this case.

The subtests were heavily relied
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sented the demise of the strict standard of A & P14 and Cuno, 65
which required advancement as well as nonobviousness. The test
was recently 66 phrased as follows: "[W]hat would be obvious to
a hypothetical mechanic who, among other things, has the prior art
in mind when he endeavors to solve the problem for which the
patent is obtained." 67
The court has used "secondary considerations" to find a patent
both valid68 and invalid. 69 It has been held that insubstantial
differences between the invention and the prior art will bar the
validity of a patent even though strong evidence of commercial
success, long-felt need and unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem has been shown.7 o The primary tests set down in Graham
appear to be determinative of patentability and only when doubt
exists will the secondary considerations be invoked.
When doubt exists, however, the court has clearly indicated
that it will look to the secondary considerations to uphold valid71
ity. In Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
the court gave lip service to the primary considerations and said
that it must look to secondary considerations to "guard against
slipping into the use of hindsight" and "to resist the temptation to
'72
read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.
Of course, as the Supreme Court went on to hold, where
the invention is minor and non-technical, such considerations are of little value but we feel that in this suit where
the components of sophisticated instruments are being interchanged and the result is a highly successful device of
substantial importance to our national security, and
therefore the incentive to invent is presumably
high, such
73
factors are appropriate for our consideration.
Because of the complexity of the art, the court was possibly incapable of determining obviousness based solely upon the primary
considerations. That would render this case analogous to Adams.
The dissent in Ling was not so stirred by national security,
but was interested in the Second Circuit's record in patent decisions. They noted that the Circuit held patents invalid far more
64. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147 (1950).
65. Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
66. Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536 (2d
Cir. 1966).
67. Id. at 538.

68. Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536 (2d

Cir. 1966).
69. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 372 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1967).

70. See Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536 (2d
Cir. 1966).
71. 372 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1967).
72. Id.at 269.
73. Id.
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often than the national average and pointed out the rigorous
gauntlet the patentee must run in their court:7 4

"[W] e held

patents invalid as 'obvious' although evidence of commercial success was far stronger than it is here. And in those cases there
had not been such vigorous sales promotion. ' 75 For commercial
success to be a valid indicator of nonobviousness, there apparently
must be a spontaneous demand for the invention.
Third Circuit
The Third Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's section 103
standard in 195670 by recognizing Lyon. Subsequent to Graham,
however, the court gravitated to a stricter A & P-type standard.
In one of the first cases 77 after Graham the court recognized
secondary considerations, but said that they would be of probative
value only when the technological factors do not clearly indicate
obviousness. Later 78 the court held that these technological factors must meet "the rigid test of patentability" 79 set down by A & P
and Cuno, at least for combinations of known elements. Thus,
doubt concerning advancement as well as doubt about nonobviousness was necessary before the secondary considerations took effect.
Recently, however, the cases indicate a trend back to the section 103 standard. The court has said80 that the alleged invention
must' l meet "the rigid requirements of Graham v. John Deere
Co.,"'

referring to the primary considerations.

This could be a

shift away from A & P and Cuno, or perhaps an indication that the
Third Circuit believes the primary considerations embody A & P
and Cuno. Still later cases indicate that the first hypothesis is
more tenable. The court has started to place more emphasis upon
the secondary considerations:8 2 "We have given consideration to
the substantial commercial success of [patentee's] flasher, well
founded in the record ...... 83 In an even later case8 4 the court
upheld the patent over an obviousness defense, saying that
[i]n any event, the mere fact that the elements are concededly old does not itself militate against patentability, as
the District Court seems to suggest.
74. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGE24 (Calvert ed. 1964).
75. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 372 F.2d 263,
275 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc., 236 F.2d 496 (3rd Cir. 1956).
77. Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451 (3rd Cir. 1966).
78. Gould-National Batteries, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc., 361 F.2d
912 (3rd Cir. 1966).
79. Id. at 915.
80. Borden Co. v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 369 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1966).
81. Id. at 102.
82. See Schmidinger v. Welsch, 383 F.2d 455 (3rd Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 462.
84. Frank W. Egan & Co. v. Modern Plastic Mach. Co., 387 F.2d 319
(3rd Cir. 1967).
MENT
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In summary, we conclude that the ... invention is

...not obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art to
which its subject matter pertains, and that it represents a
significant advance in the field. In doing so we have given
measured weight to the "secondary considerations" of "commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure
of others" to achieve the result acknowledged as relevant
indicia .... 85

One reason to believe that A & P and Cuno remain with the Third
Circuit is the non-statutory language in the above quotation that
"it represents a significant advance in the field."
Sixth Circuit

After the passage of section 103 the Sixth Circuit initially
adopted the position that the section was a statement of the existing case law, including A & P and Cuno. 6 This view was later
limited to patents employing known elements in combination.,7
Three recent decisions, however, indicate an adoption of Graham
and the decline of A & P and Cuno. In one case88 the patent in
question was held valid and the court emphasized the secondary
considerations: "The nature of the prior problem, the success of
the device, and, indeed, defendant's copying of same, all help to
reinforce this view [that the patent is valid]. '' 9 The court
further indicated an adoption of section 103 by saying: "At least
in combination, we believe these features supply the 'nonobviousness' required by section 103 for patentability." 0
Although the secondary considerations have taken a foothold, Cuno still enters the decisions of the Sixth Circuit and for,
validity "more than a slight technological advance" 91 may be required. This is a non-statutory requirement, but the secondary
considerations92 may be used to show that such an advancement
has occurred.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit will still recognize a "new and useful result" as a basis for patentability of a combination of old elements. 93 There has been some discussion that a "new and useful
result" as a basis for showing nonobviousness was emasculated
85. Id. at 323.
86. See General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912 (6th
Cir. 1953).
87. See Bobertz v. General Motors Corp., 228 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956).
88. United States Gypsum Co. v. Dale Industries, Inc., 383 F.2d 497
(6th Cir. 1967).
89. Id. at 502.
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 502.
92. See United States Plywood Corp. v. General Plywood Corp., 370
F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1966).
93. See FMC Corp. v. F.E. Myers & Bros., 384 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1967).
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by Graham and that the Adams "unexpected result" replaced it,04
but the Sixth Circuit has not adopted this position. This means,
in terms of the primary considerations in Graham, if the difference between the prior art and the invention is a new and useful
result, the invention will be nonobvious and patentable.
Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has decided eight pertinent infringement
cases since Graham. Previously A & P was in full force, 95 but
subsequent to Graham the court has vacillated as to the effect it
will give secondary considerations, using them as a basis for validity in several instances.9 6 In other cases, however, the court has
said that secondary considerations are clearly subordinate to primary considerations and even when positive secondary considerations exist, they will not override a finding of obviousness based
on the prior art.97 The most recent decision followed the latter
reasoning and held a patent invalid in the face of commercial success and copying by the defendant.98
The cases after Graham do not refer to A & P and Cuno; instead, they indicate that the nonobviousness test should be used
as set down in Graham and section 103. As long as the circuit
refuses to give weight to the secondary considerations, however,
and relies upon a comparison of the prior art with the invention, a
standard more difficult than contemplated by section 103 and
94. The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have discarded the "new
and unusual result" test to determine nonobviousness. The Sixth Circuit
and the District of Columbia Circuit have expressly held that it was not
overturned by Graham. The problem arose because the Supreme Court
did not recognize the holding by the Eighth Circuit in Cook that the Cook
device produced a new and useful result and therefore was patentable.
This would appear to overrule an accepted basis for patentability which
goes back at least to 1881 when the Supreme Court upheld a patent on
that basis in Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881). What will
replace the new result test in those circuits which have abandoned it is
unclear. For a discussion of this point see Note, The 1966 Patent Cases:
Creation of a Constitutional Standard, 54 Gzo. L.J. 1320, 1347 (1966).
95. See Helm Prod., Inc. v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1955).
96. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. General Kinematics Corp., 363 F.2d 336
(7th Cir. 1966), where the court said: "While commercial success and the
filling of a long felt want do not determine patentability, they do serve to
guard against what the United States Supreme Court called 'the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.'
Id. at 337. See also Bishman Mfg. Co. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 380 F.2d
336 (7th Cir. 1967); Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 365 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1966).
97. See Novo Indus. v. Standard Screw Co., 374 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.
1967); T.P. Labor's, Inc. v. Heige, 371 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1966); Corn Prod.
Co. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 359 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1966).
98. See Gass v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 387 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1967).
See also Leach v. Badger Northland, Inc., 385 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1967),
where there was some showing of an unsolved need.
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Graham is present, even though there is no requirement of advancement.
Finally, the new and useful result test has been abandoned."
This would appear to mean that a combination will only be nonobvious if putting the elements together was nonobvious, and not
if the result of putting the elements together was nonobvious. A
dissent to this position, however, indicated that the new and useful
result test was still viable since it was incorporated into the Adams'
unexpected result test. 10 0
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Court of Claims, and
the D. C. Circuit
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals recognizes secondary considerations as having probative value in determining obviousness. 1 1 Indeed, this court has almost elevated secondary
considerations to primacy 10 2 by saying:
The fact that an invention seems simple after it is made
is not determinative of the question of obviousness. If
this were the rule, many of the most beneficial patents
would be stricken down. If those skilled in the mechanical
arts are working in a given field and have failed to discover a certain new and useful improvement, the one who
first makes the discovery frequently has done more than
make an obvious improvement which would have suggested itself to a mechanic skilled in the art, and such
an
10 3
invention is entitled to the grant of a patent thereon.
This partially refutes a statement by the Commissioner 10 4 that
collateral evidence through affidavits would not alter the question of obviousness.
The court also views a combination as a whole to determine
obviousness instead of looking at the individual elements. 0 5 Fur99.

See Walt Disney Prod. v. Fred A. Niles Corn. Ctr., Inc., 369 F.2d

230 (7th Cir. 1966).

100. The unexpected result in Adams was contrary to the scientific
thinking of experts. A new and useful result is hardly that.
101. See In re Grout, 377 F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Herr, 377
F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Trbojevich, 361 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
102. See In re Wanderham, 378 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
103. Id. at 987.
104. In March, 1966, the Commissioner of Patents said in an address to
the examining corps:
[I] f the examiner is satisfied that the claimed invention is clearly
obvious in view of the teaching of the prior art, to a person having
ordinary skill in the pertinent art, then a patent should not be
granted even if affidavits, terminal disclaimers, and the like are

presented by the applicant, since such papers cannot change what

is obvious so it may become unobvious and therefore a patentable

invention.

825 O.G. PAT. OFF. 826, 827 (1966).
105. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Vogel, 363
F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1966). But see In re Dailey, 357 F.2d 669 (C.C.P.A.
1966).
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thermore, emphasis is placed upon the need for the Patent Office
Examiner to base his rejection on factual determinations and not
upon conclusions unsupported in fact. 10 6 A & P and Cuno are
not even suggested by this court.
The Court of Claims recognizes the Graham and section 103
standard and notes that secondary considerations will have no
effect 0if7 the prior art clearly demonstrates that the patent is obvious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applies the nonobviousness test of section 103108 and further
recognizes that a new and useful result can be a basis for patentability.109 As for the secondary considerations, the court has said
that they will be of no avail if the invention is clearly obvious." 0
In cases of doubt, however, the secondary considerations will be
used.
Circuits Which Adhere to A & P and Cuno
Fifth Circuit
Advancement and nonobviousness, therefore A & P and Cuno,
have been the standard of patentability since section 103 was
enacted in 1952.111 This rigid position continues even after Graham, and the secondary considerations are minimized to the point
of having almost no probative value. In Zero Manufacturing Co. v.
Mississippi Milk ProducersAss'n,"' the court noticed the secondary considerations, but attached no importance to them even
though the result obtained by the patent was somewhat unexpected. In a later case' the court said that the primary considerations showed obviousness as a matter of law, even though there
was tremendous commercial success. There was a strong dissent,
however:
Admittedly commercial success in iself [sic] does not support patentability,

. .

. but once novelty and uitility have

been established, as they have been with respect to the
106. See In re Wagner, 371 F.2d 877 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Khelghatian, 364 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1966). See also In re Mabbott, 364 F.2d 466
(C.C.P.A. 1966) (concurring opinion).
107. See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. United States, 373 F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl.
1967). The court noted as to secondary considerations: "When the claimed
invention is obvious in light of the prior art, these other facts may not
make the patent valid." Id. at 977.
108. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wolowitz, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
See also Wolowitz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 255 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1966).
109. See Higley v. Brenner, 387 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
110. Id.
111. See Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Prod. Co., 215 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
112. 358 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1966).
113. Up-Right, Inc. v. Safeway Prod., Inc., 364 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1966).
See also Sisko v. Southern Resin & Fiberglass Corp., 373 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.
1966).
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patent in suit, commercial success weighs heavily against
the contention that the claims in1 14issue were obvious to
skilled mechanics in the same field.

This quotation apparently has not impressed the Fifth Circuit, for
the court has applied the rigid A & P and Cuno tests to date with
unflagging zeal, noting in 1967115 that "[ilt is, however, to be
doubted that § 103 effected any real change in patent law.""' 6 The
most recent case did not mention A & P or Curo, but referred to
the primary considerations in Graham:1 ' "We have applied this
method in several recent cases."" 8 This statement is not accurate,
however, and A & P and Cuno continue as the standard with little
regard for the secondary considerations.
Eighth Circuit
A & P and Cuno have been"19 and still are the basis for determining patentability in the Eighth Circuit. Section 103 and the
Graham trilogy did not even ruffle their thinking except perhaps to harden their viewpoint since Cook came from the Eighth
Circuit.

The test 120 for combinations of old elements is whether

"the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts."'121 The
secondary considerations are seldom mentioned and their bearing
on the outcome of a case is at best nominal. 122 Indeed, the court
recently indicated that even the substantial secondary considerations existing in Cook will not be a basis for assigning secondary
considerations probative value since the considerations in Cook did
123
not impress the Supreme Court.
A & P and Cuno and their attendant requirement for advancement are prevalent in the opinions.'2 4 The court has also
114. 364 F.2d at 585.
115. Ludwig Drum Co. v. Solar Musical Instr. Co., 376 F.2d 827 (5th
Cir. 1967).
116. Id.at 830.
117. National Filters, Inc. v. Research Prod. Corp., 384 F.2d 516 (5th
Cir. 1967). But see Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th
Cir. 1967), where the court at least recognized secondary considerations.
118. National Filters, Inc. v. Research Prod. Corp., 384 F.2d 516, 517
(5th Cir. 1967).
119. See Selmix Dispensers, Inc. v.Multiplex Faucet Co., 277 F.2d 884
(8th Cir. 1960); Caldwell v.Kirk Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1959).
120. See Greening Nursery Co.v.J & R Tool & Mfg. Co., 376 F.2d 738
(8th Cir. 1967).
121. Id. at 740.
122. See Gerner v. Moog Indus. Inc., 383 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1967); General Mills, Inc. v.Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967).
123. Id.
124. See Greening Nursery Co. v. J & R Tool & Mfg. Co., 376 F.2d 738
(8th Cir. 1967), where the court said: "The conjunction or concert of
known elements must contribute something .... ." Id. at 740. See also
General Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967); Superior
Concrete Acc. v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 369 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1966);
Skee-Trainer, Inc. v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 361 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1966).
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abandoned the new and useful result test as a basis for determining nonobviousness, 125 noting that this was the directive of
the Supreme Court in Graham."6 The Eighth Circuit has gone so
far as to indicate that the totally unexpected result in Adams may
of8
be the minimum requirement of patentability. 127 The thinking 12
the Eighth Circuit can best be summarized in its own language:
"The adverse effect of patent monopolies upon the public is noted
[in Graham] ."129
Ninth Circuit
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has'8 0 and still
does adhere to the severe test of A & P and Cuno: "[I] n the
special case of combination patents, the 'severe test' . . . must be
applied and satisfied before a combination patent can be recognized.."'3 Likewise, secondary considerations have almost no effect
in the Ninth Circuit:" 32 "And commercial success, while pertinent
in considering whether the invention is novel, is insufficient to
133
sustain a patent that is clearly invalid."'
In a design case the court went so far as to say that commercial success has absolutely no bearing on the question of obviousness, but only goes to show novelty and usefulness. 134 The
125. See L & A Prod., Inc. v. Britt Tech. Corp., 365 F.2d 83 (8th Cir.
1966).
126. Id. at 85: "The Supreme Court concluded that neither patent was
valid, reversed our judgment in Calmar and affirmed our judgment in
Graham, although noting, p. 4 of 383 U.S., 86 S. Ct. 684, 687 that, by our
'new result' approach in that case, we had not applied the correct test."
127. See id. at 86.
128. General Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967).
129. Id.at 667.
130. See Kwikset Locks, Inc. v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
131. Santa Anita Mfg. Corp. v. Lugash, 369 F.2d 964, 967 (9th Cir.
1966); see Bentley v. Sunset House Dist. Co., 359 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1966),
the court
-,her,
said: "In assessng the p. ..
b--"uity of combination
patents, we are to apply a 'severe test,' whether 'the whole in some way
exceeds the sum of its parts to produce' unusual or surprising consequences
from the unification of the elements." Id. at 144; Hensley Equip. Co. v.
Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1967); M.O.S. Corp. v. John I. Haas Co.,
375 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1967); Jeddeloh Bros. Sweed Mills, Inc. v. Coe Mfg.
Co., 375 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1967); Brunswick Corp. v. Columbia Indus., Inc.,
362 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1966).
132. See Aerotec Indus. v. Pacific Scientific Co., 381 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1967). See also Marshall v. Ove Shou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.
1967); Brunswick Corp. v. Columbia Indus., Inc., 362 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1966).
133. Aerotec Indus. v. Pacific Scientific Co., 381 F.2d 795, 803 (9th Cir.
1967).
134. Payne Metal Enterprises Ltd. v. McPhee, 382 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
1967): "Commercial success tends to show that the design was new, original and ornamental, which are essential elements under 35 U.S.C. § 171.
But it does not tend to show that the design was nonobvious, this being
an essential element under 35 U.S.C. § 103." Id. at 546 n.7.
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court also noted that the facts in Adams represent a minimum
standard of patentability and that an unexpected result will create
patentability only when previously accepted scientific thinking
has been overturned to develop the invention. 135 It is difficult to
imagine a more stringent standard of patentability than that which
obtains in the Ninth Circuit.
Circuits Which Have Not Spoken
First Circuit
The First Circuit prior to Graham adhered to the A & P and
Cuno standard. 38 The district court opinions following Graham,
however, show a definite trend away from A & P and toward the
section 103 standard. Thus, the test for patentability has become
what one reasonably skilled in the art would have found obvious,'137 thereby affirming that the Hotchkiss standard had not

been changed. 38 The subtests are recognized 3 9 and their probative value has developed from use in situations where there is a
question of doubt 4O to this statement in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
General Instrument Corp.:141-

On the basic question whether a patented invention
was or was not obvious at the time it was made, the courts
apply objective standards, and one of the most dependable
is whether the invention filled a long felt need and was
promptly adopted by the industry. Other factors significant to the inquiry are the degree of commercial success
of the patented product and the
42 extent to which others
failed in their quest for the goal.
A citation to Grahamand Adams accompanied this quotation.
Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit applied the nonobviousness standard prior
to Graham.143 District court opinions after Graham,however, indi135. See Jeddeloh Bros. Sweed Mills, Inc. v. Coe Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 85
(9th Cir. 1967).
136. See Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co., 217 F.2d 402 (lst Cir.
1954).
137. See Uncas Mfg. Co. v. McGrath-Hamin, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 1008
(D. R.I. 1967); Colourpicture Publishers, Inc. v. Mike Roberts Color Prod.,
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967).
138. See Eastern Plastics Corp. v. Ranci, 273 F. Supp. 854 (D. R.I.
1967).
139. See Philips Elec. & Pharmac. Indus. Corp. v. Electronic Prod., Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 705 (D. Mass. 1966).
140. See Eastern Plastics Corp. v. Ranci, 273 F. Supp. 854 (D. R.I.
1967).
141. 275 F. Supp. 961 (D.R.I. 1967).
142. Id. at 983.
143. See Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Shelby Poultry Co., 293 F.2d 127 (4th
Cir. 1961).
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cate vacillation between the section 103 standard and A & P and
Cuno. The cases immediately following Graham evidence an adoption of the section 103 nonobviousness standard. 144 In so doing one
district court affirmed the new and useful result test and rejected
that nonobviousthe unexpected or surprising result test, 14saying
5
ness is all that is required for patentability.
Later cases, however, have held that for a combination of old
elements to be patentable, the whole must exceed the sum of its
parts. 146 The most recent case employed the A & P standard and
47
held a patent invalid in the face of great commercial success.
The secondary considerations, however, have recently received recognition and were the basis for finding validity in a case in which
a combination employed new elements.14 This case did not refer
to A & P but relied upon Graham as the test, probably because
the invention was not a combination of old elements. In Wayne
Knitting Mills v. Russell Hosiery Mills, Inc.' 49 the court cited
A & P as the standard and noted that improvement as well as
nonobviousness was required for combinations of old elements.
The court mollified this position, however, by recognizing the new
and useful result test and relying heavily upon secondary considerations in finding the patent valid.
Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has vacillated from an adoption of the
Hotchkiss standard'5 0 to a requirement of a "flash of genius."' 5'
In the main, however, the Tenth Circuit followed the section 103
standard before Graham.
There is some indication that it will
1 52
continue to do So.

144. See Eversharp, inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.
Va. 1966); Gunter & Cooke, Inc. v. Southern Elec. Serv. Co., 256 F. Supp.
639 (M.D. N.C. 1966).
145. See Blaw-Knox Co. v. Hartsville Oil Mill, 269 F. Supp. 205 (D.
S.C. 1967).
146. See Grinnel Corp. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 277 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Va. 1967).
147. See Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 278 F. Supp. 34
(S.D. W.Va. 1967).
148. See Porter Cable Mach. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 274 F.
Supp. 905 (D. Md. 1967).
149. 274 F. Supp. 934 (M.D. N.C. 1967).

150. See Blish, Mize & Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools,

Inc., 236 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1956); Matt Corp. v. Sunflower Indus. Inc.,
314 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1963).

151.

See Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp. v. Midwestern Instr. Inc.,

260 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1958).
152. See Griswald v. Oil Capital Valve Co., 375 F.2d 532 (10th Cir.
1967), where the court referred to the ordinary mechanic.
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CONCLUSION

All circuits except the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and possibly the
Fourth are apparently moving toward the statutory section 103
standard of nonobviousness, thereby discarding the last vestiges of
the strict A & P and Cuno standard requiring advancement. In
those circuits which have accepted the section 103 standard, the
subtests or secondary considerations enumerated in Graham have
had varying degrees of efficacy in determining nonobviousness.
The secondary considerations are usually utilized when the court
has determined that the patent is not clearly obvious in light of
the prior art, when there is doubt as to the patent's obviousness,
or when the difference between the invention and the prior art is
insubstantial. If none of these circumstances exist, the patent is
usually held invalid even in the face of strong secondary considerations.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of
Claims adhere to the section 103 nonobviousness standard. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals gives great weight to secondary considerations and has indicated that they should be taken
into account by the Patent Office Examiners to determine obviousness.
The "new and useful result" test has been discarded by the
Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits since Graham. The Sixth,
District of Columbia and possibly the Fourth still recognize this
test for determining nonobviousness. In those circuits that discarded the test, it is not clear what has replaced it. There is some
indication that the Adams unexpected and unusual result may
be the new basis.
The Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits are steadfast in adhering
to the strict standard of A & P and Cuno. The district courts in
the Fourth Circuit are now also applying the A & P standard. In
so doing these circuits, with a few notable exceptions, have given
little effect to the secondary considerations. The considerable
secondary considerations in Cook appear to be the necessary minimum in the Eighth Circuit before that circuit will look to them
for probative value.
It is unfortunate that the subtests have been relegated to
contingent importance, for they posed the one real hope for uniformity among the circuits because of their objective basis. Instead, courts must first look to the prior art and compare it with
the invention in question to determine obviousness. Almost by
definition uniformity among the circuits is impossible because of
the subjectivity which inevitably accompanies a standard operating in a legal vacuum.
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